Secret and confidential

Every time Argentina gives a glimpse of evolution, in fact, it is a step backwards.

31 de Agosto de 2015

Analysis gave me great freedom of emotions and a fantastic confidence. I felt I had served my time as a puppet.

Hedy Lamarr (Austrian actress; 1914-2000)

* * * 

Every time Argentina gives a glimpse of evolution, in fact, it is a step backwards. So it was with the massive 2012 popular demonstrations (or cacerolazos) and the subsequent ones. Soon after, the political corporation itself took part in organizing events of the kind in their political opposition version (the concept of 'corporation' is not mitigated if a segment, whichever it may be, comes to prominence). In any case, infiltrations implemented in the protests eventually liquefied ordinary citizens’ interest to join any future banquet; the rebellious spirit is torn.

Then, inspiration is renewed in the shape of agreed public statements with the aim of supporting prosecutor Jose María Campagnoli, consolidating his restitution in proceedings delving in cases of obscene official corruption.

Very little happened after that; rather, the consequence was an unintended one, in other words, the cluster of prosecutors started negotiations with the Supreme Court of Ricardo Lorenzetti and the Federal Government, to end protests and seal a kind of iudicialis indutias (truce) between two high branches of the State.

A posteriori –on February 18, 2015, one month after Alberto Nisman’s strange death–the so-called Prosecutors March took place. With silence as a leit motiv, the judicial community led a new summon seeking that investigations into the assassination do not become prematurely extinct.

As before, the initiative measurable results were naive; society did not realize that it had been playing the power games of a few seeking to mend their saddlebags from a stronger position. As a proof to consolidate this hypothesis, it must be remembered that one of the prosecutors who participated in the demonstration was Carlos Stornelli, indicated by well-informed political analysts as an operator for Scioli in the administration of justice.

Over time, it would be found out that Daniel Scioli and his judicial consorts did their best to cause Nisman case to languish in a bizarre and unbelievable cover sheet of suicide. Meanwhile, it became necessary that a handful of indolent elements conveniently redirected the herd of idiots’ shouting. Mission accomplished.

Which was the lapidary legacy of the prosecutor’s physical disappearance? The early stages of the murder hinted at a path stained with clues about the ideologists and architects of the scheme, partially thanks to the central and marginal players’ obvious ineffectiveness.

In any case, the surprising thing was not the execrable human quality of those involved, but the conspiracy magnitude. As far as it can be validated, former judges, intelligence operatives, hackers, political leaders, journalists and unknown varieté commentators took part in the gigantic charade. While Nisman’s death reached local media publishers on January 19, a former US official (with over two decades of experience in the foreign service and the Department of State, regularly in touch with this journal) shared his verdict via email: [it was an] 'outrageous and criminal criminal act'. In Argentina, the suggestion of a suicide seemed more comfortable to many.

These days, new evidence appearance re-calibrates the compass giving strength to the homicide theory. As we have seen, the monumental propaganda effort from the national government could not hide the physical damage –in the form of beatings, collated by recent expert evidence– shown by the prosecutor’s body in the final moments of his life. As well as the malware that was sent to Nisman’s personal computer under the tag 'Estrictamente Secreto y Confidencial.PDF' (Strictly Secret and Confidential). Interestingly, it was the same trojan found in one of journalist-investigator Jorge Lanata’s computers and other secondary characters bearing a deeper knowledge of what really happened.

This introduction will be useful for any judicial body exhibiting a minimum of credibility (certainly not Viviana Fein or her suspected colleagues) to take note and conduct a clean investigation in the future. Because Nisman case could only be understood from the extensive knowledge of how a well-identified node of parallel intelligence works, exercising their skills against Argentine citizens with impunity.

In this regard, the magnifying glass of any professional and dedicated investigation should be reoriented, for example, towards former judge Héctor Yrimia and his undistinguished subordinate, Allan Ramón Bogado. In spite of his prominent service record, Yrimia –in accordance with research conducted by third party countries– often boasts, privately, about being the mastermind and perpetrator of the AFI (Federal Agency of Information) which caught so much negative attention from the traditional media.

As the former judge is linked to the aforementioned Bogado (with whom he meets in private at least once a week, and who is said to act as a Gendarmería Nacional (National Gendarmerie) 'inorganic' agent or N.O.C., an intelligence agent who works off the books), one might perfectly guess the services his chief offers to a select but defined customer portfolio. For what purpose did Yrimia decide to turn to countries as far as China and the Russian Federation? Meanwhile, to what end Ramón Bogado –who, by the way, uses his Twitter account to monitor independent journalists– would go on several occasions to Iran, Venezuela or Germany?

The problem for those involved in the plot is that their movements suddenly increased, precisely prior to Nisman’s death.

Additionally, this colorful gang held meetings with Iranian representatives –which already publicly expressed annoyance towards investigations conducted by the deceased judicial officer from AMIA Special Unit. Which is Yrimia’s role in Nisman’s affair? From the late prosecutor’s research it comes out that he was striving to divert attention from the Islamic Republic responsibility in the 1995 attack; besides, according to that essential documentation Yrimia conspired with Fernando Esteche (Quebracho) and Jorge ¨Yussuf¨ Khalil to make up false lines of investigation about the attack.

Did former judge act as a political liaison to siege Alberto Nisman and then hack his computer, using a cell of crackers nucleated in his own organization? Today, independent investigators even put the Prefectura Naval Argentina (Argentine Naval Prefecture) under the magnifying glass –because its members, reporting to the Ministry of Security, monitored the prosecutor’s movements to provide information to barely identified characters.

The emergence of this trendy trojan deserves to be evaluated from a perspective involving its own dynamics: who send and control it? Some focus their attention to freelance computer technicians settled in Uruguay, perhaps related to Aníbal Fernández and the always indecipherable provincial major Mario Ishii.

These –logically– will deflect responsibility towards Fernando Pocino’s circle (SIDE, Information Gathering); and the remaining afflicted will go against Jaime Stiuso or Héctor Icazuriaga. Unfortunately, the trail of bread crumbs could lead to unpleasant findings: outsourcing of espionage in neutral ground invites to consider well-known personalities from the world of journalism, politics and entrepreneurship –read: power.

Argentine society is not yet prepared to come face to face with this monstrosity of colossal dimension. Additionally, Uruguay serves as a vaporous limbo; a land where many await repatriation or a commission that never comes (and never will). Witheringly emulating Don Diego de Zama, a character conceived by the famous writer Antonio Di Benedetto.

Going back to nice Héctor Yrimia, there are other chapters turning him into a relevant individual for very dissimilar US divisions such as The Department of the Treasury or the FBI, due to his documented relation with the Colombian citizen, Juan Miguel Rodríguez Arbeláez. The aforementioned is Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela’s son, the founder of the Cali cartel together with his brother Giberto and José Santacruz Londoño in the seventies. While former judge publicly denies personal meetings with President Cristina Kirchner, he boasts of such meetings, when he speaks in private. He also declares that more than a hundred people in the Argentine judicial sphere are available for him.

Finally –and, with a dash of color– Héctor Yrimia has gone as far as to propose himself as ¨an agent of the Vatican State.¨ Perverse but allowed interpretation: after his heated defense of FPV presidential candidate, Daniel Scioli, His Holiness Francisco could afford to apply a better criterion when choosing his friends.

If the objective was to build a bridge between the two big issues shaping the present text (the coitus interruptus of the demonstrations and Nisman case), there would be only one conclusion: one way or another, the protagonists of this charade have assumed with resignation their respective roles in this intricate and maze-like ant farm.

Tomorrow is a new day.

* English translation by Debbie Gravano-Jordan | Originally published in Spanish, on AUG 18th 2015, in


Sobre Matias E. Ruiz

Es Analista en Medios de Comunicación Social y Licenciado en Publicidad. Es Editor y Director de El Ojo Digital desde 2005.